Security update 1.3.3
We fixed a gap that could let a website read details you masked on another site. We found it in our own review and know of no abuse.
Say you asked ChatGPT this morning for help with a letter about your mother’s care. Kamelo masked her name as [PERSON_1] and kept the real one in the vault on your device.
Since 1.3.0, that vault is kept per site. What you mask on chatgpt.com is only restored on chatgpt.com. That’s the promise. This update fixes a way around it.
What was wrong
Web pages can contain frames: small windows that show a page inside a page. Most frames have their own web address. Some don’t, like an empty about:blank frame, or a srcdoc frame whose content the page writes itself.
Kamelo didn’t tie those frames to any site, so it treated every detail in your vault as allowed there. A malicious page could put placeholders like [PERSON_1] in such a frame and read back the real values.
What we fixed
Those frames now belong to the page around them. A frame Kamelo can’t place gets nothing.
We found this in our own security review. We know of no abuse.
What you should do
Make sure you have Kamelo 1.3.3 or newer. Your browser updates extensions by itself. To check, open chrome://extensions (or edge://extensions), turn on Developer mode and look at the version under Kamelo.
What comes next
Kamelo 1.4.0 goes a step further. Websites only ever get their own part of the vault. The full vault, and the key of a locked vault, stay inside Kamelo itself, out of reach of every website, even one that has been hacked.
Finding gaps and closing them is part of the job, and it’s why our code is open. Found something yourself? Please tell us privately.
Update, and carry on.